• This paper takes as a given that Poland will adopt the euro (perhaps in 2011) and asks how it should manage the transition.
• It focuses on the boom-bust problem that has afflicted other catch-up economies around the time of euro adoption.
-It analyzes how and why those cycles occurred. Definition: The index of housing prices is constructed as a weighted average of index of actual rentals for housing prices, index of imputed rentals for housing prices, index of maintenance and repair of dwellings prices, index of water and miscellaneous domestic services prices, and index of electricity, gas and other fuels prices.
Source: Euromonitor International (2008).
Here is credit growth in Poland & the CEE-10 Definition: Loans to households include loans to households and non profit institutions serving households (NPISH); loans to firms include loans to non financial firms and non monetary financial firms; loans to general government.
Source: OeNB (2007).
The question is what these differences imply for the future • Answer is not clear.
-On the one hand, there could be something different about Poland that inoculates it from credit cycles and limits the boom-bust problem. -On the other hand, the very fact that credit growth has lagged (and housing prices haven't risen as elsewhere) means that there is scope for their (even more) rapid increase in the run-up to euro adoption.
What is this boom-bust scenario?
• Nominal interest rates come down as monetary policy credibility is enhanced by euro adoption.
• Inflation, by comparison, is relatively inertial.
• Hence there is a decline in real as well as nominal interest rates.
• We can see this in the next graph for four earlier euro adopters. • The resulting economic boom fuels wage demands.
• The current account gap widens, competitiveness deteriorates.
• As this momentum and exuberance build up, there can be overshooting.
• Eventually, the deterioration in competitiveness results in a sharp slowdown, a loss of consumer and investor confidence, and the need for a grinding deflation.
• "All that is left are the memories and the hangover." This is the canonical case, but there are exceptions
• Slovenia did not experience this kind of boombust cycle.
-Maybe because interest rates had already declined to euro-area levels well before it adopted the single currency in 2003.
• Malta and Cyprus similarly do not show severe dislocations due to this cycle.
-Maybe because they too had relatively high incomes, well-developed financial systems and credible central banks, and again did not experience sharp declines in interest rates around the time of euro adoption. Is Poland at risk of this kind of cycle?
• The first step in formulating an answer is to ask what has happened to interest rates so far.
-Here rates in euroland are the natural benchmark.
Nominal interest rate on loans to the private sector: Poland and Euroland
• We see here that loans to firms have already come down to euro area levels.
• But not so loans to households.
• So Poland would seem to be an intermediate case.
- If there is a credit boom, how big exactly might it be?
• To answer this, we estimate a simple model of private credit/GDP levels.
-We use annual data for 50 middle-income countries since 1996.
• This private credit/GDP ratio is taken as a function of:
-Nominal interest rates -Real GDP per capita -The CPI inflation rate -An index of financial openness • These are the central variables used in previous studies of credit growth.
• The model fits the data well and is robust to a variety of extensions.
• Although precise coefficient estimates depend on choice of estimator, as we explain in the text.
• In particular, for 2006 Poland remains a significant outlier (see slide following). Source: See text.
Our most reliable estimates show the private credit/GDP ratio to be 10 percentage points "too low"
• Assume 5 per cent growth of nominal GDP.
• Assume that this 10 per cent of GDP shortfall is eliminated in two years. • Second, we can assume that the independent variables continue to grow as in recent years, extrapolate, and use our estimated coefficients.
-This yields a predicted ratio to GDP for 2010 between 48 and 85%, depending on the point estimates you prefer. (second column next slide) -Our preferred model (column c) yields a ratio of 52 per cent in 2010. Again, this suggests an annual average rate of nominal credit growth of around 9-10 per cent.
• Substantial but not highly alarming by the standards of other catch-up economies adopting the euro.
• Maybe now too high in light of recent events? 
